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Apophasis and the Trinity: 
on the enduring significance of 
revelation for theology1
Gabriel Morgan
Plato understood that describing God is impossible.2 However, according 
to Gregory of Nazianzus, to know God is even less possible.3 Gregory radicalizes 
apophaticism in this way as a critique of Eunomius and his claim to know the 
divine nature by definition as that which is without origin. However, one can take 
apophaticism in at least two very different directions. One direction might argue 
that because God is unknowable and ineffable, therefore, in the words of Sallie 
McFague, “all language about God is human construction and as such perforce 
‘misses the mark’.”4 Accordingly, one might argue that very few or even no reli-
gious or theological claims are any more inherently valid than another, and that 
such claims are to be evaluated by strictly moral or pragmatic considerations; the-
ology should likewise progress from dogmatics to the methods of the general study 
of religion.5 However, another way of taking such radical apophaticism is precisely 
to recognize the enduring significance of revelation for theology. Rather than the 
final word, God’s ineffability and transcendence presupposes God’s condescension 
and revelation in the Trinitarian economy. 
The following paper is an exercise in historical dogmatics. In it I attempt 
to offer what Paul Ricoeur called a non-violent appeal concerning the enduring 
significance of revelation for theology, and its implications for how we should 
think of theology as a discipline and the methods that we use in its study. In this 
endeavor, I have chosen to draw extensively from Gregory Nazianzen’s Theological 
Orations, but complimented by material from Catherine LaCugna, Paul Ricoeur, 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and Martin Luther. I have taken this route not in order to 
1 An abridged version of the following paper was presented at the Fordham graduate 
conference, “The Limits of the Thinkable: Religious Experience and the Apophatic Impulse Between 
Antiquity and Modernity,” with a keynote address from professor Catherine Keller, on 8 February 
2014. I am grateful to Professor Keller for her encouragement.
2 Timaeus, 28c.
3 Oration 28.4, in Frederick Williams and Lionel Wickham trans., On God and Christ: The 
Five Theological Orations and Two Letters to Cledonius (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Press, 2002); see also 
Frederick Norris, Faith Gives Fullness to Reasoning: The Five Theological Orations of Gregory of Nazian-
zen, Wickham and Williams trans. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991).
4 Sallie McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: 
Fortress, 1987), 23.
5 e.g. John Hick’s position understands the various religious traditions to represent inad-
equate expressions of what ultimately remains an inaccessible Real, common to them all, similar 
to Kant’s phenomenal/noumenal distinction; see Paul Knitter, Introducing Theologies of Religions 
(Maryknoll: Orbis, 2008), 113–7. See also Wilfred Cantwell Smith, What Is Scripture? A Comparative 
Approach (Minneapols: Fortress, 1993), 229. 
cover over their real theological differences, but in order to make a more broadly 
ecumenical argument that focuses on an area of greater consensus, the doctrine 
of the Trinity.6 But the tradition from which I approach Gregory is not without 
its own reception, for Philip Melanchthon once praised Gregory as “the perpetual 
voice of the Church.”7 Gregory’s trinitarian theology is a fitting subject also be-
cause it is inherently concerned with the human knowledge of God. For my argu-
ment is focused upon the unity of the economic and immanent Trinity, which has 
epistemological consequences that are incompatible with the view that theology is 
reducible to human construction. 
“Only the suffering God can help.” So wrote Dietrich Bonhoeffer from 
Tegel prison on 16 July 1944. On what basis did Bonhoeffer make such a claim? 
According to Catherine LaCugna, how we answer this question gets at the very 
heart of Christian theology. After all, this was one of the major points of division 
between Nestorius and Cyril in the Christological controversy that led to Chalce-
don in 451. Nestorius strictly denied that one could say God suffered, not even in 
the person of Christ, and considered it a pagan mentality to do so.8 Cyril, on the 
other hand, was quite adamant that the personal union of God and humanity in 
the person of Christ meant that in some paradoxical sense God was born, suffered, 
and died for us.9 One could affirm here a real communication of attributes, but the 
formulas themselves are not as important as the unity of the person, a point shared 
by Gregory, Cyril, and Bonhoeffer.10 For them, all human and divine attributes in 
Scripture are to refer to this single person, Jesus Christ, God on earth who suffered 
and died for us.11 This Christological debate has some proximity for us today, in 
6 This route differs from that taken by Tuomo Mannermaa, who has argued for a doctrine 
of θέωσις in Luther as the center of justification; see Braaten and Jenson eds., Union with Christ: The 
New Finnish Interpretation of Luther (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998). Knut Alsvåg took a similar 
route to that proposed here in “Impassibility and Revelation: On the Relation between Immanence 
and Economy in Orthodox and Lutheran Thought” (paper presented at the annual meeting for the 
American Academy of Religion, Baltimore, Maryland, November 22–26, 2013).
7 Philip Melanchthon, De Gregorio, 283–4; paraphrased in H. Ashley Hall, Philip Melanch-
thon and the Cappadocians: A Reception of Greek Patristic Sources in the Sixteenth Century (Bristol, CT: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2104), 100.
8 Nestorius, in his reply to Cyril’s second letter: “[T]o attribute to the Godhead, in the name 
of this appropriation [of the human nature], the properties of the flesh that is associated with it (and 
I mean generation, suffering, and death)... is either the error of a pagan mentality, brother, or a spirit 
sick with the madness of Apollinaris and Arius and other heresies, or even something far worse,” in 
John McGuckin, St Cyril of Alexandria and the Christological Controversy (Crestwood, NY: St Vladi-
mir’s Press, 2004), 367.
9 In his third letter, Cyril replies: “[W]e understand that there is One Christ Jesus, the Only 
begotten Son, honoured together with his flesh in a single worship, and we confess that the same Son 
and Only Begotten God, born from God the Father, suffered in the flesh for our sake, in accordance 
with the scripture (cf. 1 Pet.4.1) even though he is impassible in his own nature,” ibid, 270. 
10 See Bonhoeffer’s “Lectures on Christology,” in Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works 12, Best and 
Higgins, trans. (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2009), 299–360.
11 See Nazianzen, Ora. 29.19, 33.14, 30.5, 45.28–9 and Carm. 1.1.10.6–9; in Christopher 
Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God: In Your Light We Shall See Light 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 134–9. 
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which the idea of the suffering God is moving even for theologians disinclined to 
speak of revelation.
Many are reluctant to return to this way of thinking because we are now so 
aware of “the constructive character of all human activities.”12 Claims to revela-
tion in the past have often and without question covered over various ideologi-
cal systems that justified the oppression of one group over another, such as the 
justification of slavery in this country, or naively masculine images of God, or our 
ecological irresponsibility. Disillusioned, we are inclined toward a methodological 
skepticism in theology, as Erasmus had once advocated in his debate with Luther 
in 1525.13 Like Erasmus, we consider confidence in theological matters to be a re-
sult of arrogance. In the words of Hans-Georg Gadamer, we are more aware today 
than ever of “the historicity of our being,” and of how everything we think and do 
is thoroughly interpretive.14 
However, according to Paul Ricoeur, this is not a reason to reject the notion 
of revelation. On the contrary, this insight into the historical conditionality of 
the human being is the very reason that we must relinquish our desire to ground 
everything in our own consciousness. In an essay titled “Hermeneutic of the Idea 
of Revelation,” Ricoeur argued that “the pretension of consciousness to constitute 
itself is the most formidable obstacle to the idea of revelation.”15 In his earlier work 
The Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur argued that “the will recognizes itself as evil, and 
admits its guilt, only in meditating on the symbols and myths carried by the great 
cultural traditions that have instructed the Western mind,” though he explains 
later that he had no intention of excluding non-western traditions with this com-
ment.16 In other words, the self does not have a direct access to itself in its own 
consciousness, but understands itself only through external symbols, texts, narra-
tives, events, and so forth.17 
This recognition of our historical and hermeneutical conditionality brings 
about “on a purely epistemological, even a methodological level, consciousness’s 
abandoning of its pretension to constitute every signification in and beginning 
from itself.”18 This constitutes “a conversion diametrically opposed to that of 
Feuerbach.”19 What does this mean? For one thing, Ricoeur argues for an episte-
mology of external testimony, and an openness to the possibility that particular 
historical moments can become invested with absolute significance. “It is precisely 
the function of the category of testimony... to demolish a bit further the fortress of 
12 McFague 1987, 21.
13 Erasmus, Diatribe, EAS 4, 28 f.; for Luther’s response, De Servo Arbitrio, LW 33:89, 97.
14 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Continuum, 2004), 159.
15 Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics (Malden, MA: Polity, 2013), 4.
16 Ricoeur 2013, 4.
17 This critique of Husserl resembles that of Jacques Derrida, though without the latter’s 
reluctance toward the idea of originary moments that bear and unveil truth, e.g. Of Grammatology, 
Gayatri Spivak trans. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 10–18.
18 Ricoeur 2013, 144.
19 Ibid, 145. For Ricoeur, “Feuerbach a montré de façon décisive que l’achèvement d’une 
philosophie de la subjectivité, c’est l’athéisme,” from “La Révélation : Discussion D’Ensemble,” in La 
révélation (Bruxelles: Saint Louis, 1977), 207–236. 
consciousness.”20 To recognize the necessity of external testimony hermeneutically 
and epistemologically is not simply to impose a heteronomous authority, argues 
Ricoeur, but to open the imagination. It is to recognize our dependence as histori-
cal beings upon external persons and traditions for what we know and how we 
think. And it is through such external testimonies and revelations that we come to 
understand and know ourselves.
However, “reflection cannot produce this renouncing of the sovereign con-
sciousness out of itself without contradicting itself. It can only do so by confess-
ing its total dependence on the historical manifestations of the divine.”21 “The 
initiative belongs to historical testimony.”22 As Dietrich Bonhoeffer wrote in his 
Habilitationschrift Act and Being, “the concept of revelation must, therefore, yield 
an epistemology of its own.”23 We may say then that a general epistemology must 
yield its claim to establish the methodological terms on which theology is stud-
ied.24 And we may extend this point to any purportedly scientific methodology 
that intends to say something unilaterally about the nature of theology. Rather, the 
method of theology must be born out of and serve its own subject matter. 
But surely not all talk of revelation is equal. Indeed, while accepting Barth’s 
critique of liberal Protestantism, Bonhoeffer nevertheless pointed out many of the 
problems for a theology of revelation in Act and Being. He criticized problems with 
Barth’s earlier concept of revelation as the act of a divine Subject, for which revela-
tion and faith become ahistorical.25 He also critiqued the problems of a conserva-
tive construal of revelation as the objective doctrinal content of the church, or we 
may add those of a subjective mechanism of inspiration in the production of the 
Bible.26 In contrast, drawing from Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology the 
insight that being precedes thought, Bonhoeffer argued that revelation is the person 
of Jesus Christ, who is a unity of God’s act and being for us, also existing as the 
church-community. In this way Bonhoeffer was able to affirm simultaneously that 




24 “The Sorbonne, the mother of errors, has very incorrectly defined that truth is the same in 
philosophy and theology,” Martin Luther, Disputation Concerning the Passage “The Word Was Made 
Flesh” (1539), in LW 38:239–79. This in contrast to a unitive epistemology; see e.g. F. LeRon Shults, 
The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology: Wolfhart Pannenberg and the New Theological Rationality 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), pp. 50–58, 68–82.
25 “Those [human beings] to whom God is revealed are the very ones to whom God cannot 
become revealed . . .  They would have to conceive of themselves as not existing in order to conceive 
the Word of God coming to them,” Karl Barth, [Die christliche] Dogmatik (1927), 1:287; cited in 
DBWE 2:94. The danger of a theology of consciousness is averted here, but “at the expense of the 
historicity of human beings and, hence, of the existential character of act” (DBWE 2:95). Rooted in 
the Reformed doctrine of the finitum non capax infiniti, the result of this conception is that “God’s 
freedom and the act of faith are essentially supratemporal” (DBWE 2:76–8). But if revelation has no 
ontological continuity in history, then neither can there be any real theological knowledge. See also 
Michael DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s Theological Formation: Berlin, Barth, and Protestant Theology (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012).
26 DBWE 2:75–105.
96 97
the revelation of God is present for us immanently within history, as well as that 
this revelation, this person, remains free with respect to that history, and is not 
reducible to it. In other words, for Bonhoeffer, God has plunged into history in the 
person of Jesus Christ.
However, it may be objected that the incomprehensibility of God stands 
finally against any talk of revelation. After all, doesn’t the idea of revelation make 
God somehow intellectually comprehensible for us? The tradition of apophaticism 
represented by Vladimir Lossky, for example, would prefer to speak, if at all, of di-
vine energies rather than revelation.27 Indeed, eastern theologians are right to point 
out and critique the Hegelian influence in much protestant theology of revelation, 
which ultimately desires to do away with the ineffability of God by conflating rev-
elation with an Absolute Knowledge of God as pure thought, “attainable in pure 
speculative knowledge alone.”28 After all, Palamas saw Basil’s distinction between 
the divine essence and energies to be necessary to affirm in light of the ineffabil-
ity of God, seeking to tie the spirituality of the vision of God not to a sensible 
perception or an intellectual vision, but to θέωσις or divinization. Nevertheless, it 
is worth considering LaCugna’s argument that the essence and energies distinction 
in the east may parallel the division of the economic and immanent Trinity in the 
west. LaCugna states:
The divine ousia, even though unknowable in itself, cannot be elevated 
beyond the divine persons. But in [Gregory of Palamas’] theology, 
since the divine hypostases belong to the supraessential, impartici-
pable essence of God, and since the energies, not the divine persons, 
enter into communion with the creature, Palamism widens the gap b 
etween theologia and oikonomia by postulating a divine realm com-
prised of essence and persons not directly accessible to the creature.29
In the words of Aristotle Papanikolaou, the essence and energies distinction 
“may render the doctrine of the Trinity superfluous,” since it is now the divine 
energies, rather than the persons of Christ and the Holy Spirit, that make God 
present and known to the human being.30
In contrast to Basil’s argument that we humans have knowledge of God only 
in God’s energies, Christopher Beeley argues that “Gregory has a stronger doctrine 
of revelation.”31 For Nazianzen, the incomprehensibility of God is precisely the 
presupposition of God’s condescension to and illumination of us in the Trinitarian 
27 Vladimir Lossky, The Vision of God, Ashley Moorhouse trans. (Aylesbury: Watson and 
Viney, Ltd.). 
28 Phe. Sp. 192; Georg W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. J. B. Baillie (Digireads 
Publishing, 2009), 344. 
29 Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (Chicago: Harper-
One, 1991), 192.
30 Aristotle Papanikolaou, “Sophia, apophasis, and communion: the Trinity in contemporary 
Orthodox theology,” The Cambridge Companion to the Trinity, ed. Peter Phan (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 249. 
31 Beeley 2008, 303.
economy. Jesus Christ is the Light of Light, whom we see in the Light of the Holy 
Spirit.32 This illumination or revelation is not a knowledge of the divine essence 
or οὐσία as such, which remains always unknowable. But should we not say that 
revelation for Gregory is indeed a real knowledge of the ὑποστάσεις, the persons, in 
whom alone the divine οὐσία exists? 
In the so-called Five Theological Orations, preached in the chapel of the 
Resurrection just prior to his troubled presidency at the council of Constantinople, 
Gregory of Nazianzus is dealing with opponents on two fronts. On the one hand, 
he is battling the “good” Nicenes about the homoousion of the Holy Spirit. On the 
other, he is responding to a new cadre of Arians, the radical Aetios and his secre-
tary Eunomius. These later Arians went well beyond the original position of Arius, 
who taught that God the Father was transcendent and as such unknowable to 
the human being.33 Since the Logos is a distinct hypostasis from the Father, and is 
derived from the Father, Arius reasoned that this Logos must have come into being 
at some point. In the words of Plato’s Timaeus, “it isn’t possible to bestow eternity 
fully upon anything that is begotten.”34 For Arius, to posit the Logos as eternal 
would be to posit two unbegottens, “two self-sufficient first principles.”35 
At least part of this argument of course invites a debate about the mean-
ing of the term “begotten” when applied to God. It makes some sense then when 
Aetios and Eunomius sought to solidify its meaning by insisting in addition that 
words revealed essences. Since the term “begotten” is the opposite of “unbegotten,” 
they reasoned that the ousia of the Father, who is “unbegotten,” must be positively 
different from that of the Son, who is “begotten.” Thus, these theologians defined 
God by the predicate: that which is without origin [ἀγέννητος]. Therefore, while 
Arius at least spoke of the divinity of the Son in some lesser sense, and of the inef-
fability of the divine ousia, for Eunomius this ineffability is denied. What was at 
stake? They were convinced that the revelation of essences by words was necessary 
to affirm in order to protect the possibility of theology and of the knowledge of 
God.36 After all, if our language cannot directly apply to God, how then is theol-
ogy even possible? As Luther would later say, they believed themselves able to peer 
into the invisible things of God.37 Remarkably, Eunomius is even reported to have 
said that “God does not know (ἐπίσταται) anything more about his own essence 
than we do.”38
32 Ibid, 90–113.
33 Rowan Williams ascribed this fact to the Alexandrian influence upon Arius, in Arius: Her-
esy and Tradition (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 143; Andrew Louth, on the other hand, ascribed 
this to the doctrine of the creatio ex nihilo, a doctrine which Arius and his opponents shared, and 
which stood in contrast to a Neoplatonic optimism concerning the vision and knowledge of God, in 
The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: from Plato to Denys (New York: Oxford, 1981), 75–7; 
contra Williams, Christopher Stead argued against any significant Neoplatonic influence upon Arius, 
in “Was Arius a Neoplatonist?”, Studia Patristica 32 (1997): 39–51.
34 Plato, Timaeus, 37d, Donald Zeyl trans.
35 Arius, from Opitz, U.6 = de syn.16, Epiphanius, haer. 69.7; in Williams 2002, 270–1.
36 Beeley 2008, 92; cf. Plato, Cratylus, 430a–431e.
37 Gerhard Forde, On Being a Theologian of the Cross (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 72–3.
38 Frag. 2, in Socrates, HE 4–7; in Beeley 2008, 92.
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Gregory begins the first theological oration in a way evocative of Luther’s 
polemic against the pride of reason:
I shall address my words to those whose cleverness is in words. Let 
me begin from Scripture: “Lo, I am against you and your pride” [Jer 
50:31].39
Gregory accuses his adversaries of mere “strife of words,” with whom there is 
no rest from controversy. These “mere verbal tricksters” act as if theology is simply 
a game of human argument.
“[T]he great mystery” of our faith is in danger of becoming a mere 
social accomplishment [τεχνύδριον]. I am moved with fatherly compas-
sion, and as Jeremiah says, “my heart is torn within me” [Jer 4:19]. Let 
these spies therefore be tolerant enough to hear patiently what I have 
to say on this matter, and to hold their tongues for a while—if, that is, 
they can—and listen to me.40
“Discussion of theology is not for everyone.”41 It is for the proper time and 
place, “whenever we are free from the mire and noise without,” and for those “who 
have been tested and found a sound footing in study, and, more importantly, have 
undergone, or at the very least are undergoing, purification of body and soul.”42 
39 Nazianzen, Ora. 27.1.
40 Ora. 27.2.
41 Ora. 27.3.
42 Ibid. Purification or κάθαρσις is the removal what is impure, ἄναγνος, that which prevents 
us from our ascent to God in divine illumination (Ora. 28.2–3; Beeley 2008, 109). This platonic 
theme is interpreted biblically by Gregory, where purification is “a contrite heart and the sacrifice 
of praise (Pss 50.23; 51.29), and a new creation in Christ (2 Cor 5.17), and the new person (Eph 
4.24), and the like, as the Scripture loves to call it” (16.2; Beeley 2008, 87). Jesus Christ assumes and 
purifies human nature in the incarnation, applied to us individually in baptism (30.1, 38.7; Beeley 
2008, 83–4). In this way, Gregory offers a complex synthesis of elements of the neo-platonic model of 
contemplative ascent assimilated to the Nicene orthodoxy of trinitarian descent. See John McGuckin, 
“The Vision of God in St. Gregory Nazianzen,” Studia Patristica 32 (1997): 145–52. Purification is 
not a major theme in Luther’s theology, and he replaces the contemplatio in the medieval practice 
of oratio, meditatio, contemplatio with tentatio, namely the suffering of the effects of God’s power-
ful Word, at the heart of his theology of the cross; see Oswald Bayer, Theology the Lutheran Way, 
Lutheran Quarterly Books, trans. and ed. Jeffrey Silcock and Mark Mattes (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2007). However, Luther does speak of purification in his Sermons on the Gospel of St John, where he 
distinguishes between two kinds of purification in parallel to the two kinds of righteousness, one 
which is imputed by the purity of Christ alone in baptism and the Word (i.e. Jn 15:3), and the other 
in which we grow in this life; the latter must grow from the former as works from faith (LW 22:426). 
In addition, purification is not for Gregory a strictly linear progression of human achievement, and he 
sharply criticizes the excessive rigorism of the Novatians on this score, a position praised by Melanch-
thon (39.18; Beeley 2008, 88; Hall 2014, 99). So while there is a significant difference here, it should 
not prevent comparison. Where Gregory focuses on trinitarian descent, he and Luther are quite simi-
lar in their arguments, which is what I have chosen to focus upon in this paper. My orienting theme 
here is close to that of divine condescension in the works of J. G. Hamann; see John R. Betz, After 
Enlightenment: The Post-Secular Vision of J. G. Hamann (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012). 
Those people should listen to theological discourse “for whom it is a serious under-
taking, [and] not just another subject like any other for entertaining small-talk.”43 
As for Luther in the Heidelberg Disputation of 1518, so for Gregory, the theologian 
must first be addressed before theological discourse can begin.
Theology should be investigated as it is “within our grasp.”44 For one to en-
gage in theology, one must approach “the mount . . . in eager hope matched with 
anxiety for [one’s] frailty.”45 Gregory now attempts a direct contemplation of the 
divine essence as Eunomius claims to be possible. Soaring above the mount and 
the clouds, Gregory was utterly concentrated in himself, “detached from matter 
and material things.”46 Yet, still after all of this, he “scarcely saw the averted figure 
of God,” like Moses taking shelter in the rock on Sinai as God passed by. Why 
does God deny Moses a direct vision of God’s face? Likewise, Gregory states that 
“peering in I saw not the nature prime, self-apprehended . . . but as it reaches us at 
its furthest remove,” namely in the majesty and grandeur “inherent in the created 
things [God] has brought forth and governs.”47 
What can we know of God from this “furthest remove”? Are we not still 
dogged by philosophical paradoxes in even our most advanced understanding 
of the physical world today? Where does consciousness reside? Or one Gregory 
likes that is still valid: when was the beginning of time?48 General relativity tells 
us there must be one. Was it in time, or before time? If in time, how can it be the 
beginning of time? But if time began before time, how then can it have happened 
before there was time? We could cite Kant’s antinomies of pure reason here, or 
other strictly logical paradoxes, complicated ones such as Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorems, or simpler ones such as the liar’s paradox. We need hardly mention the 
mysteries of dark energy and dark matter, conceptual place holders for something 
about which we know essentially nothing. Now how can anyone think they 
understand the divine being when by our reason we barely understand ourselves 
and the creation? Scientific knowledge of the world merely “thinks out a rule 
and gets the title ‘knowledge’,” such that it remains at the level from which it 
begins in common awareness or visual experience.49 Thus it cannot penetrate into 
“things celestial” which have to do with ultimate or final causes.50 Where prop-
erly regarded, however, scientific knowledge leads to “the dawning of awe.”51 As 
Athanasius once famously argued, the lyre does not play itself.52 Mechanisms can 
always be explained away by other mechanisms, but beauty refuses such positivist 
reductionism. By this “dawning of awe” in the beauty and grandeur inherent in 




47 28.3; cf. Augustine, De Trin., XV, ch 7, § 13; ch 27, § 50. 
48 Nazianzen, Ora. 29.9.
49 Ibid, 28.29.
50 28.28.
51 McGuckin 2001, 288.
52 Contra Gentes 38.4.
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the creation, we may know that there must be some divine origin of things, but 
not what or Who.53 
Here Gregory is more critical of the analogy of nature than Augustine, per-
haps as critical as Luther.54 However, Gregory does not want us simply to abandon 
all reason in a form of fideism. Rather, like with a Buddhist koan, Gregory wishes 
for us to truly pursue reason tenaciously, so as to see that reason will only get us so 
far. As Nicolas of Cusa states in On Learned Ignorance, “it is evident that Philosophy 
(which endeavors to comprehend, by a very simple understanding, that the maxi-
mal Oneness is only trine) must leave behind all things imaginable and rational.”55 
However, since this is impossible for philosophy, the human being makes a final 
effort to try to see, to gain a direct mystical vision. But God refuses to grant this di-
rect vision even to Moses. Meister Eckhart’s doctrine of the “little point” in the soul 
comes to mind here, where God throws the philosopher back in recognition of their 
creaturehood when finally attempting a direct vision of the divine ground, some-
thing at which D.T. Suzuki labors to reconcile with his own non-dualist views.56 
Gregory concludes: “Though every thinking being longs for God, the first cause, it 
is powerless, for the reasons I have given, to grasp him.”57 As such, then, it is impos-
sible to know God. Theology is impossible for the human being. 
We may add to Gregory’s arguments the painful problem of theodicy. If God 
is all-good, all-powerful, and all-knowing, why then do such terrible things happen 
all the time? Please do not say “because freedom,” and so on. I would never give 
my child “freedom” to play in the street if he or she so chose, and then say when 
she was killed by a vehicle, “oh well, it was her choice.” By this I do not mean to 
advocate some form of determinism. Rather, I mean that the analogy doesn’t work, 
because we have an utterly asymmetrical relationship with God. Since no analogy 
is adequate, reason must fail to comprehend God directly, who apart from Christ is 
for us deus absconditus.58 If on this sensitive subject I may speak of my own life, why 
would God allow my mother to be murdered when I was just a boy? Will we try to 
comfort ourselves by saying that perhaps God is not really all-powerful after all, in 
which case how can God be the creator of heaven and earth, or for that matter the 
savior? And off we go trying to peer into the invisible things of God. Writing on 
Luther’s Heidelberg Disputation, Gerhard Forde states:
Theologians, you might say, are like Sisyphus, condemned in Hades 
to rolling a huge stone up the hill, only to have it constantly roll back 
down. Incidentally, it is interesting to note that Sisyphus was con-
53 Beeley 2008, 112; cf. Nazianzen, Ora. 28.6.
54 Ora. 31.8, 10; cf. Beeley 2008, 112; Forde 1997, 72–3.
55 De Doc. Ig. I, 10.29.
56 D. T. Suzuki, Mysticism Christian and Buddhist (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2002), 
79–89.
57 Nazianzen, Ora. 28.13.
58 McGuckin also describes Gregory’s position with this phrase in 1997, 149.
demned in that manner because he had discovered some of the secrets 
of Zeus!59 
One might advocate a form of negative theology in response to these 
problems. Since we cannot say what God is directly, we might rather study God’s 
essence indirectly by what God is not.60 According to Gregory, however, the Eu-
nomian definition is itself negative theology, and that’s part of the problem. It is a 
fundamentally negative definition—“not generated”—and thus it is not knowledge.61 
Therefore, even as Gregory cannot deny such omni-predicates as omnipotence 
mentioned before, nevertheless, they do not actually say anything about God. “For 
what has the fact of owning no beginning, of freedom from change, from limita-
tion, to do with [God’s] real, fundamental nature?”62 Gregory continues:
A person who tells you what God is not but fails to tell you what he 
is, is rather like someone who, asked what twice five are, answers “not 
two, not three, not four, not five, not twenty, not thirty . . . [etc. etc.]”63 
Now had Gregory known a thing or two about calculus and mathematical 
limits, he might not have used a mathematical illustration for this point, though it 
is well taken nonetheless. I don’t know my friend Lisa by saying not Charlie, not 
George, not Alex, not RJ, and so forth. Also, my dad is that which is without hair, 
and I am that which is without a job. All these are empty conceptual placeholders, 
mere rational projections, that really say nothing about who we are.
How then is knowledge of God possible if theology is impossible for the 
human being? Gregory gave us a hint in his earlier orations when he said that his 
partial vision of God was “sheltered by the rock, the Word that was made flesh 
for us.”64 So we must turn to the mysterious activity of God in the trinitarian 
economy, and the testimony to it in the “grand and sublime language” of Holy 
Scripture.65 Gregory states:
Faith rather than reason shall lead us, if that is, you have learned the 
feebleness of reason to deal with matters quite close at hand, and have 
acquired enough knowledge of reason to recognize things which sur-
pass reason. If so, it follows that you will not be a wholly earthbound 
thinker, ignorant of your very ignorance.66 
59 Forde 1997, 74.
60 Thomas Aquinas, Sum, I, Q 3–12.
61 Nazianzen, Ora. 28.9; see also John Anthony McGuckin, St Gregory of Nazianzus: An 
Intellectual Biography (New York: St Vladimir’s Press, 2001), 286.
62 Nazianzen, Ora. 28.9.
63 Ibid.
64 Ora. 28.3; Beeley 2008, 113.
65 Nazianzen, Ora. 29.17.
66 28.28.
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For when we abandon faith to take the power of reason as our shield, 
when we use philosophical enquiry to destroy the credibility of the 
Spirit, then reason gives way in the face of the vastness of the reali-
ties. Give way it must, set going, as it is, by the frail organ of human 
understanding. What happens then? The frailty of our reasoning looks 
like a frailty in our creed. Thus it is that, as Paul too judges, smartness 
of argument is revealed as a nullifying of the Cross. Faith, in fact, is 
what gives fullness to our reasoning.67 
As Luther states, because people “misused the knowledge of God through 
works, God wished again to be recognized in suffering, and to condemn wisdom 
concerning invisible things.”68 If Gregory’s opponents had yet gained this more 
mature knowledge of “the frail organ of human understanding,” and we might 
add, of all of its hermeneutical and historical conditionality, then they would not 
have so quickly scorned the strange revelation of the crucified God.
Gregory in no way wishes to stop at apophasis. Like Origen before him, 
Gregory states that, as the human being Jesus Christ, “the Incomprehensible might 
be comprehended.”69 The true theologian, for Luther, does not seek to penetrate 
into the invisible things of God through the creation, but instead remains with 
“what is visible of God” made manifest through the cross of Christ.70 God is onto-
logically present for us in Jesus Christ, the icon and glory [κλέος] of the Father.71 Je-
sus Christ is the Logos of Theos enhumanized, God made visible.72 We should even 
say: Jesus Christ is theology, the knowledge of God. For the confession of the divinity 
of the Son and the Spirit is theology for Gregory.73 Thus, while theology and economy 
are distinguished by Gregory, nevertheless theology is in this way “the fuller clarifi-
cation, deepening, and extending of the meaning of the divine economy.”74 For we 
“worship the Crucified,” Gregory says, God lifted up upon the cross.75
67 29.21; cf. McGuckin 2001, 287–8.
68 LW 31:52; in Forde 1997, 78–9.
69 Nazianzen, Ora. 39.13; in Beeley 2008, 113.
70 Forde 1997, 71.
71 E.g. Col 1:15; D. A. Sykes explains that “The epic κλέος is made to answer to all the uses of 
the biblical δόξα, strengthening the εἰκών language in the same way as δόξα does in, e.g., Origen, Jo. 
13. 25 (p. 249. 30, M. 14. 444Α),” in Gregory, Claudio Moreschini, and D. A. Sykes, Poemata Arcana 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 97.
72 Nazianzen, Ora. 37.1–3; in Beeley 2008, 123, 141; see also Athanasius, de Incarn. 15.1–2, 
16.1. 
73 Beeley 2008, 194.
74 See Nazianzen, Ora. 38.8; in Beeley 2008, 195 and 201; thus the church fathers do not 
all divide the “economic Trinity” and the “immanent Trinity”; e.g. Karl Rahner, “Oneness and 
Threefoldness of God in Discussion with Islam,” Theological Investigations 18 (London, 1984), 105–21; 
contra Hans Küng, Christianity: Essence, History, and Future (New York: Continuum, 1995), 171–2; 
but neither do they completely collapse them either; see McGuckin 2001, 309; on LaCugna’s ten-
dency to collapse the economic and immanent Trinity, see also Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, The Trinity: 
Global Perspectives (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 187–90. We must make the first, 
epistemological side of Rahner’s idenfitication while qualifying the second; see Yves Congar, I Believe 
in the Holy Spirit, v 3 (New York: Seabury Press, 1983), 13–17. 
75 Nazianzen, Let. 101.5; ref. John 3.
Regardless of how similar or different our situation may be today, to 
continue to insist at this juncture on a form of theological skepticism is to once 
again divide the economic and immanent Trinity, to consider what God is “really 
like” to still be somehow inaccessible or unknowable to us, behind the veil of our 
intellectual, linguistic, or cultural conditionality. But this is simply to return to 
the initial point about God’s incomprehensibility and our own limits, which is in 
no way a refutation of God’s revelation in the Trinitarian economy, but rather the 
presupposition of it. Gregory is well aware that terms like “Trinity,” “hypostasis” 
and “ousia” are indeed human conceptual constructs, but they are nevertheless em-
ployed in service to the revelation of God the Father in the persons of Jesus Christ 
and the Holy Spirit. In the words of Henri Bouillard,
History thus manifests at the same time the relativity of notions, of 
schemes in which theology takes shape, and the permanent affirma-
tion that governs them. It is necessary to know the temporal condition 
of theology and, at the same time, to offer with regard to the faith the 
absolute affirmation, the divine Word that has become incarnate.76
In service to that revelation, such terms and concepts are examples of faith 
giving fullness to reasoning, and as such are no longer reducible to human con-
struction.77 They have become a part of the grammar of the Church.78 This is not 
to make a metaphysical claim anymore than a mythological one.79 Gregory has 
already torn down the possibility of peering into invisible realities by pure specu-
lative reason. Moreover, the “reality” to which I would refer us here is the world 
already reconciled in Jesus Christ.
In Christ we are invited to participate in the reality of God and the 
reality of the world at the same time, the one not without the other. 
The reality of God is disclosed only as it places me completely into the 
reality of the world. But I find the reality of the world always already 
76 Bouillard, Conversion et grace chez S. Thomas d’Aquin: Étude historique, Théologie 1 (Paris: 
Aubier, 1944), 220–1; cited in Knowledge of God, trans. Samuel D. Fermiano (New York: Herder and 
Herder, 1969). Bonhoeffer’s view, to similar effect, is in contrast grounded in the contingent ontologi-
cal continuity of the incarnation in an analogia relationis of Christ existing as community, rather than 
in an extension of the Thomist analogia entis.
77 See also Christopher Morse, “Raising God’s Eyebrows: Some Further Thoughts on the 
Concept of the Analogia Fidei,” Union Seminary Quarterly Review 37 (Fall/Winter 1981–2): 1–2; 
for a Lutheran perspective on the distinction between primary and secondary theological discourse, 
see also Gerhard Forde, Theology is for Proclamation (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), 135–90; 
as related to Nicene theology, see Charles Arand, Robert Kolb, and James Nestingen, The Lutheran 
Confessions: History and Theology of the Book of Concord (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2012), 45–6. 
78 Brian E. Daley, S. J., Gregory of Nazianzus (New York: Routledge, 2006), 41; on Mel-
anchthon’s concept of the grammar of the church, see also Hall 2014, 61–5. Not therefore beyond all 
possible critique, yet irreducible to human construction.
79 See also Bayer 2007, 3–32.
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borne, accepted, and reconciled in the reality of God. That is the mys-
tery of the revelation of God in the human being Jesus Christ.80 
The Trinity is not a metaphysical theory that awaits putting into practice, 
but rather already is both God’s act and being for us and for our salvation.
We truly know this Jesus Christ, the revelation of God, through the Spirit’s 
ministry of word and sacrament in the church community.81 By these mysteries 
the full divinity of the Spirit is revealed as the spiritual meaning of Scripture.82 We 
truly hear the Spirit speaking through Scripture, the proclamation of the gospel, 
and the words of absolution. We are incorporated into this body of Christ by bap-
tism, and we find our fulfillment as a Christian community in the holy eucharist. 
John Zizioulas takes a page from Bonhoeffer in the following, though without 
Bonhoeffer’s tendency to neglect the Spirit: 
When we make the assertion that [Christ] is the truth, we are mean-
ing His whole personal existence . . . that is, we mean His relationship 
with His body, the Church, ourselves. In other words, when we now 
say “Christ” we mean a person and not an individual; we mean a 
relational reality existing “for me” or “for us.” Here the Holy Spirit 
is not one who aids us in bridging the distance between Christ and 
ourselves, but he is the person of the Trinity who actually realizes in 
history that which we call [the Body of] Christ, this absolutely rela-
tional entity, Our Savior . . . The eucharistic community is the Body 
80 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, DBWE 6:40.
81 Beeley 2008, 265; see also Martin Luther’s Small Catechism, “The Creed,” art. 3; this 
not to the exclusion of concrete discipleship, e.g. Jon Sobrino, Jesus the Liberator, trans. Burns and 
McDonagh (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1993), 43; nevertheless, for Bonhoeffer, the justification of the sinner 
in Word and sacrament is God’s ultimate Word over us and is the core of the revelation of Christ as 
the new human community of reconciliation in the forgiveness of sins; yet in order that that Word 
might actually be heard as gospel and that it might comfort, respect for the penultimate in this life in 
concrete obedience to Christ toward liberation of the oppressed is essential and is also God’s Word; 
see Bonhoeffer, Ethics, DBWE 6:137–145; for more on Gregory’s understanding of the knowledge of 
God by the whole body of the church, see Daniel Opperwall, “Sinai and Corporate Epistemology in 
the Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus,” in Studia Patristica 67 (2013): pp. 169–78; J. Jayakiran Se-
bastian is quite right then when he says that Gregory “would certainly acknowledge the reality of the 
involvement of the Trinity in the life of the people,” in “Intertwined Interaction: Reading Gregory of 
Nazianzus amidst Inter-religious Realities in India,” A World For All? Global Civil Society in Political 
Theory and Trinitarian Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), pp. 171–2.
82 Gregory’s hermeneutic here consists of extended typology that is often functionally 
equivalent to allegory along the lines of an Origenist model of a three stage progressive revelation; see 
Kristoffel Demoen, Pagan and Biblical Exempla in Gregory Nazianzen, Lingua Patrum II (Brepols, 
1996), 249–86; see also Demoen “The Pradigmatic Prayer in Gregory Nazianzen,” Studia Patris-
tica 32 (1997): 101; see also Joseph Trigg, “Knowing God in the Theological Orations of Gregory of 
Nazianzus: the Heritage of Origen,” God in Early Christian Thought: Essays in Memory of Lloyd G. 
Patterson, McGowan, Daley S.J., and Gaden, eds. (Boston: Brill, 2009), 83–104. This is the reason for 
Gregory’s boldness in affirming the ὁμοούσιον of the Spirit despite there being no letter of Scripture to 
directly prove it, something which Melanchthon is reluctant to acknowledge; see Hall 2014, 140. 
of Christ par excellence simply because it incarnates and realizes our 
communion within the very life and communion of the Trinity . . .83 
As Bonhoeffer concludes Life Together, 
The day of the Lord’s Supper is a joyous occasion for the Christian 
community. Reconciled in their hearts with God and one another 
[through absolution and mutual consolation], the community of faith 
receives the gift of Jesus Christ’s body and blood, therein receiving 
forgiveness, new life, and salvation. New community with God and 
one another is given to it. The community of the holy Lord’s Supper is 
above all the fulfillment of Christian community. Just as the members 
of the community of faith are united in body and blood at the table 
of the Lord, so they will be together in eternity. Here the community 
has reached its goal. Here joy in Christ and Christ’s community is 
complete. The life together of Christians under the Word has reached 
its fulfillment in the sacrament.84
Through this ministry of word and sacrament, we not only worship, but are 
also actually taken into the very life of the Holy Trinity, through Jesus Christ, in 
the Holy Spirit. For if I am baptized in the name of the Holy Spirit, who grafts 
me to Christ and divinizes me in baptism, so that by the Spirit I come to know 
God [Θεὸν ἔγνων], then surely the Holy Spirit is true God.85 As Gregory concludes, 
“One links with the other, a truly golden chain of salvation.”86
For Gregory, the Trinity is not a collection of three instances of the same 
class or genre.87 The unity of God the Holy Trinity resides in God the Father 
as the sole source of the Trinity and of the whole of the economy of salvation.88 
Contrary to some modern thinkers, the monarchy of the Father does not con-
stitute subordinationism, since such an interpretation would again presume that 
being “unbegotten” is essential to the definition of the Divinity, the very position 
Gregory is always attacking.89 The monarchy of the Father is what gives rise to 
the distinct identities of the three persons of the Trinity. This is by virtue of the 
manner in which the Father gives generation, in one case by manner of a “beget-
ting”, and the other by “procession,” both equally mysterious and beyond our 
83 John Zizioulas, Being as Communion (Crestwood: St Vladimir’s), 110–14.
84 DBWE 5:102. 
85 See Arcana 3.15–16; Melanchthon considers this general argument of the Cappadocians 
to be conclusive; see Hall 2014, 139–40. Luther does not object to the language of “partaking of the 
divine nature,” as we see in his commentary on 2 Pet 1.4, perhaps written in 1522; see LW 30:153–4.
86 Nazianzen, Ora. 31.28.
87 Beeley 2008, 306.
88 McGuckin 2001, 247. 
89 Nazianzen, Ora. 31.9; Beeley 2008, 209; LaCugna 1991, 391; contra Wolfhart Pannen-
berg, Systematic Theology v. 1, trans. Geoffrey Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans), 334; on Luther’s 
subscription to the monarchy of the Father, see WA 10.1:151.7–155.24, 183.13–186.8, cited in Robert 
Kolb, Martin Luther: Confessor of the Faith (New York: Oxford, 2009), 113. 
96 97
comprehension. This relation [σχέσις] defines the persons; their respective defin-
ing characteristic [ἰδιότης] is their manner of generation, making them who they 
are. Thus, hypostasis for Gregory may be said to mean a non-accidental particular, 
personal subsistent entity or being with personal agency, who is distinguished by a 
characteristic relation to the Father. As Beeley concludes, 
There are no abstract hypostases that exist apart from the divine 
nature that they share; there are only the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, 
who are unoriginate, begotten, and proceeding Divinity. Likewise, 
the divine nature does not exist apart from the Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit, who are the Divinity.90
Now if the divine ousia exists only as the hypostaseis of Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit, then we cannot bypass the thoroughly personal notions of sin and 
forgiveness for theology. In his 1535 Commentary on Galatians, Luther recognized 
this connection. In contrast to Jerome, he favors a literal interpretation when 
Paul says in Galatians that “Christ redeemed us from the curse of the Law, hav-
ing become a curse for us—for it is written: cursed be everyone who hangs on a 
tree.”91 Christ is not simply punished for the sins of the world, but rather accepts 
the actual guilt and the curse of the sins of the entire world, as if he himself had 
committed all sins. For God actually made him to be sin for us.92 Here Luther 
insists that we must read the church fathers in the light of Scripture. “Whatever 
sins I, you, and all of us have committed or may commit in the future, they are 
as much Christ’s own as if He Himself had committed them.”93 Therefore, “in 
the same Person, who is the highest, the greatest, and the only sinner, there is also 
eternal and invincible righteousness.”94 These two “come together and collide with 
such a powerful impact.”95 
[Sin], I say, attacks Christ and wants to devour Him as he has devoured 
all the rest. But [Sin] does not see that He is a Person of invincible and 
90 Beeley 2008, 222.
91 Gal 3:13.
92 2 Cor. 5:21.
93 LW 26:278; Nazianzen has a notion of a “great exchange” that has some parallels with 
Luther’s, following from the principle that what was not assumed was not redeemed (Let. 101.3, 5; see 
also Formula of Concord, Ep., Art. VIII, affirm. thesis 10). When responding to the Eunoniam desire 
to subordinate the Son to the Father, Gregory comments on the same texts in Galatians and Corinthi-
ans: “No—look at this fact: the one who releases me from the curse was called “curse” because of me 
[κατάρα ἤκουσε δι᾽  ἐμὲ]; “the one who takes away the world’s sin” was called “sin” and is made a new 
Adam to replace the old. In just this way too, as head of the whole body, he appropriates my want of 
submission [ἐμὸν ἀνυπότακτον ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖται]. So long as I am an insubordinate rebel with passions 
which deny God, my lack of submission will be referred to Christ” (Ora. 30.5). So Christ is not only 
called sin and a curse for me, which is amazing in itself, but he actually makes my rebellion to be his 
own [ἐμὸν ἀνυπότακτον ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖται]. 
94 LW 26:281.
95 Ibid.
eternal righteousness . . . Thus in Christ all sin is conquered, killed, and 
buried; and righteousness remains the victor and the ruler eternally.96 
The faith that alone justifies—trust [fiducia] for Luther, and not fides acquisi-
ta97—is true worship that attributes divinity rightly to God. To trust completely in 
Christ, to have faith in Jesus, is to attribute total and complete divinity to him as 
the new human being through whom life and righteousness comes to humanity.98
When Arius denied this, it was necessary also for him to deny the 
doctrine of redemption. For to conquer the sin of the world, death, the 
curse, and the wrath of God in Himself—this is the work, not of any 
creature but of the divine power.99 
Faith ascribes divinity to Christ as belonging essentially to him, and not ac-
cidentally.100 Could this not shed a fresh perspective on Gregory’s use of the term 
“hypostasis” as an instance of faith giving fullness to reasoning? By defining divin-
ity tautologically, the Arian position renders personhood an accidental characteris-
tic of divinity, as does any attempt at a direct vision of the divine ousia apart from 
the hypostaseis. Yet, this is what we all attempt to do all the time, left to the devices 
of reason alone. For how can reason deduce the person? Isn’t it rather the case that 
the person must be revealed?
We come up against this Jesus Christ and attempt the usual academic pro-
cess of the classification of objects. We try to understand this divine Logos from 
the human logos. We demand to know how this could be the case that God could 
take flesh and be revealed. We demand that this revelation be falsifiable by our own 
rational criteria.101 However, as Bonhoeffer points out, the constant asking of the 
“how” question shows that we are “chained to our own authority.”102 The sinner 
is trapped in its game of rational self-determination and self-justification. This is 
the heart curved in on itself, the condition of sin, which for Bonhoeffer is not the 
choice for evil, but rather the taking on of the knowledge of good and evil itself 
96 Ibid.
97 i.e. Gal 3:1–3 and Rom 10:17.
98 Rom 3:26, 5:1–21. 
99 LW 26:282.
100 Cf. in contrast E. P. Meijering, “The Doctrine of the Will and of the Trinity in the Ora-
tions of Gregory of Nazianzus,” God Being History (New York: American Elsevier, 1975), 110–11.
101 As Norris points out, “From Gregory’s viewpoint, it would always be odd to attack 
anything Arian with the narrow syllogistic arguments they so preferred. Too much modern theology 
has employed Arian methods to denounce Arian positions, a pyrrhic victory,” in “Gregroy Nazianzus’ 
Poemata Arcana: A Poetic, Musical Catechism?”, Union Seminary Quarterly Review 63 (2013): 74, 
n.46. So also Luther in the 1539 Disputation: “20. This is indeed not because of the defect of the syl-
logistic form but because of the lofty character and majesty of the matter which cannot be enclosed in 
the narrow confines of reason or syllogisms.” Thus, for theology we must learn “a new language in the 
realm of faith apart from every sphere,” (LW 38:239–79).
102 DBWE 12:283.
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apart from God’s Word.103 As Bonhoeffer understood, like Luther before him, the 
claim to a knowledge of God by our own powers or abilities, and the claim to be 
able to do what is good by our own abilities, are two sides of the same coin. 
Indeed this piety [of the knowledge of good and evil] was supposed to 
consist in humankind’s going back behind the given word of God to 
procure its own knowledge of God. This possibility of a knowledge of 
God that comes from beyond the given word of God is humankind’s 
being sicut deus; for from where can it gain this knowledge if not from 
the springs of its own life and being? Thus for their knowledge of God 
human beings renounce the word of God that approaches them again 
and again out of the inviolable center and boundary of life; they re-
nounce the life that comes from this word and grab it for themselves. 
They themselves stand in the center.104 
conclusIon
To reclaim this center, God the Logos has taken flesh and fully entered 
history as the person of Jesus Christ. This means that there is such a thing as 
revelation, immanently present within the circle of our historical conditionality. As 
Christians, we truly know Jesus Christ, and thus truly know God, even if we are 
not always clear about how we know that we know this Jesus. Such is the task of a 
dogmatic reflection on the epistemological consequences of Trinitarian theology. 
If there truly is such a thing as the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, then 
not all theology can be reduced to human construction. And if theology cannot be 
reduced to human construction, then dogmatics as a critical discipline of testing 
concerning sound teaching about that revelation is methodologically necessary to 
the discipline of theology.105 In line both with this dogmatic principle and with 
the nature of hermeneutics, our method here has been neither that of the pure 
historical continuity of a consensus antiquitatis, nor that of an historicist gap or of a 
protestant leap over all church history and tradition in the name of sola scriptura.106 
103 Bonhoeffer and Nazianzen diverge quite drastically here. For Nazianzen, the tree of the 
knowledge of good and evil caused the fall only because it was partaken of too hastily— and rather 
represents the vision of God that is identical with θέωσις. See e.g. Poemata Arcana, 7.118–22. Still, 
even for Gregory we may say that “they grab it for themselves.”
104 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, DBWE 3:108.
105 See Christopher Morse, Not Every Spirit: A Dogmatics of Christian Disbelief (New York: 
Continuum, 2009). Moreover, this epistemological consequence of Trinitarianism is an important 
reason for a Trinitarian regula for biblical hermeneutics. E.g. Irenaeus, Adv. Haer., 1.10.1; Brevard 
Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 31–2; 
Gadamer 2004, 176–7, 326–8; Anthony Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan, 1992), 156; James Voelz, What Does This Mean? Principles of Biblical Interpretation in the 
Post-Modern World (St Louis: Concordia, 2003), 219–29; see also Telford Work, Living and Active: 
Scripture in the Economy of Salvation (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002). 
106 For more on Melanchthon’s theology of church history and of the authority of the early 
fathers, see Hall 2014, 53–66. 
Our method here has rather been that of a critical historical continuity according 
to a dogmatic guideline, the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. 
One of the early courses I was privileged to take at Union Theological 
Seminary in New York was on Dietrich Bonhoeffer with the Dietrich Bonhoef-
fer Professor of Theology and Ethics, Christopher Morse. This course gave me an 
important orientation as a young Lutheran at Union. His dogmatic approach to 
Bonhoeffer was shaped by his work on Barth, an approach that, though criticized 
by some Bonhoeffer scholars concerned to highlight the real theological differ-
ences Bonhoeffer had with Barth, is nevertheless justified because of their common 
affirmation of a theology of God’s Word and revelation in contrast to a theology of 
consciousness. Through his courses and many discussions, I learned that dogmat-
ics was not a rigid and backward discipline of simply repeating the formulas of the 
past, over which the adjective systematic was always to be preferred, but was indeed 
rather the critical task of Christian theology, by which we hold all things under the 
light of Jesus Christ, the revelation of God. 
We cannot speak of the suffering God and then turn around and speak of all 
theology as mere human construction. There is a difference between “theology” as 
our academic or human discourse about God, limited though necessary, and that 
“Theology” or revelation of God that some of our concepts are made to serve. In 
the words of Catherine LaCugna:
By carefully qualifying the concept of God’s ‘inner life’, and by 
making all metaphysical claims function directly with respect to the 
economy of salvation, a revitalized doctrine of the Trinity calls to 
account all theologies of God, it forces us to admit their partiality 
and inadequacy, and it requires that every interpretation of who God 
is be measured against what is revealed of God in the economy. The 
doctrine of the Trinity is in this sense not a teaching about God but 
the doctrine that specifies the conditions and criteria under which we 
may speak of God.107 
This is a matter not of our talk about God, but of God’s condescension and 
revelation for us.
107 LaCugna 1991, 380.
